Are rents, or excess profits, good for development? Using industry-level manufacturing data, this paper demonstrates a negative effect of rents, measured by the mark-up ratio, on productivity growth. The negative effect is strongest in poor countries, suggesting that high profits stymie economic development rather than enable it. Consistent with the rent-seeking mechanism of our model, we find that high rents are associated with a slower reduction in tariffs. A country's average mark-up in manufacturing is a strong negative predictor of future economic growth, indicating that we may be measuring a phenomenon of the broader business environment.
Introduction
Are rents, or excess profits, good for development? We seek to answer this question by examining panel data at the industry level and applying analytical methods from the competition-and-growth literature (see Aghion and Griffith 2005) to a larger group of countries along the development spectrum. Economic theory supports both sides of the argument, thereby offering conflicting advice for competition policy and anticorruption efforts. Surprisingly, there has been little statistical research in the last decade and a half since data availability has improved to increase the sample size by two orders of magnitude from earlier studies (e.g. Ades and Di Tella 1999) and the theoretical debate has become more complex.
On the one hand, rents seem to be a compelling feature of successful economic development. "Schumpeterian rents" (Galunic and Rodan 1997) can incentivize innovation and thus bring about the economic development Schumpeter was talking about, as the economy became more sophisticated and productive. "Without profit," Schumpeter (1934) noted, "there would be no accumulation of wealth."
A different view of rents and development can be found in North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009) . North and co-authors argue that most societies in history-including today's developing economies (North et al. 2007 )-are "natural states" in which a dominant coalition of elites carve up the economy into protected rents that can be collectively enforced. As these natural states become more consolidated, elites have an interest to promote specialization and trade in order to increase the amount of rents at play (p. 49). By this mechanism, rents go part and parcel with political stability, and their presence is required if the economy is to develop.
1
A third idea can be found in the voluminous access-to-finance literature. Financial sector development is a key correlate of economic development (Levine 1997) . Countries with less developed economies grow slower. In those countries, retained earnings are an important source of capital for new investment. It thus seems logical that an economy or industry that enjoys higher profits or rents should be able to fund a faster expansion.
Taken together, these three conceptualizations highlight the crucial role for rents in eco-
Introducing an edited volume that applies North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009) to today's developing countries, North et al. (2012) recognize that some rents might generate a drag on growth while others enable it, but they do not find a pattern across the case studies analyzed (p. 20).
nomic development: as an incentive for innovation, a glue to keep elite interest in stability and expansion, and a source of capital for investment. Yet in spite of this logic there is a case to question the notion that high profits are good for economic development.
The strongest challenge to this notion is the flip side to North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009) . Business interests can capture the state (e.g. Stigler 1971 ), or vice versa (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny 2002) . Rents, rather than being used to promote growth, can be used to sustain the status quo, which is often one of limited competition. They can lead to corruption, since bureaucrats who preside over high-rent sectors will be able to extract more from the private sector (Ades and Di Tella 1999) . Rent-seeking activities exhibit increasing returns to scale, thus making rents self-sustaining, and because they are anti-innovation provide a further drag on growth (Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny 1993) . Rent-seeking can draw talent from the productive sector (Acemoglu 1995) and be destructive to entrepreneurship in particular (Baland and Francois 2000) .
The other first-order challenge to the view that rents are good for development is the flip side to Schumpeter. Rather than being an incentive for innovation, high profits may be a lack of incentive to do much at all-or, as Hicks (1935) said, "the best of all monopoly profits is a quiet life" (p. 8). If managers are not profit-maximizing and are lazily enjoying the rents from limited competition (e.g. Hart 1983 ), then higher rents can lead to slower growth rather than more investment. Only when firms are at risk of losing their business are managers forced to innovate.
To tackle this question, we first construct a model that allows for either productive rents or unproductive rents. Our model is a basic one to provide the intuition behind our empirical approach. A number of firms compete in Cournot competition, such that the profit of each firm is decreasing in the number of other firms in the market. Firms can either use their profits to create new products or collude to prevent new entrants to the market, and their profit-maximizing decision depends on the relative returns to each. This captures the ambiguous overall prediction of the effect of rents on growth.
We model developing countries as having three characteristics. One, a lower quality of public administration or competition policy makes it easier to bribe regulators to prevent entry. This makes the cost of rent-seeking lower in poorer countries. Two, profits on new products are higher due to the ability of firms in poor countries to copy existing technologies. These two features lead to the prediction that observed ex-post profits should be higher in developing countries, consistent with the financial literature on market segmentation (Bekaert et al. 2011) . Three, credit constraints are more likely to be binding in poor countries. The combined effects result in an ambiguous prediction of whether rents are better or worse for growth in poor countries than they are in rich countries. We test the model using the Lerner index as a measure of rents, following Nickell (1996) , Aghion et al. (2005a) , and Aghion, Braun, and Fedderke (2008) . The Lerner index (Lerner 1934) , also called a mark-up ratio, is equal to the difference between price and marginal cost divided by price. Under perfect competition, price should equal marginal cost giving a value of zero for the index. The greater the degree of monopoly pricing, the higher the index. In practice, marginal cost data are unavailable for large panel data applications, so mark-up is approximated using a variant of profits over revenues (Aghion et al. 2005a) . Since firm-level data in less-developed economies is spotty and unavailable in time series for most countries, we follow Aghion, Braun, and Fedderke (2008) and use industry-level value-added data from the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO 2013). UNIDO's INDSTAT data are available for around 20 manufacturing sectors in over 100 countries since the 1960s. The mark-up ratio we calculate is a measure of both rents and (lack of) competition, and in both the theory and empirics, we do not make an attempt to separate these two concepts.
We supplement the UNIDO data on the mark-up ratio with other industry and nationallevel variables and test the predictions of the model. Unlike our predictions, which are ambiguous about the relationship between profits and growth, our results are decidedly unambiguous. First, we find support for the prediction that observed rents are higher in less developed countries-virtually any indicator of underdevelopment is associated with a higher average Lerner in the manufacturing sectors. Second, we find that the relationship between rents and growth is strongly negative, with the results being primarily driven by the poorer countries (or those with higher political risk) in the sample. This result, that higher excess profits are correlated with slower growth in developing countries, is robust to a series of modifications to the specification including instrumenting for mark-up using the average mark-up in other industries in the country.
We then split the sample along two dimensions: financial sector development (as measured by the size of the banking sector relative to GDP) and the degree of external finance required by the industry (taken from Rajan and Zingales 1998) . If access-to-finance constraints are binding, then rents may be especially helpful to finance innovation in sectors that require external finance but in markets with weak financial sector development. In fact, we find that the effect of rents on growth is especially harmful in this quadrant. In other words, far from being a way to finance investment out of retained earnings, rents seem to be the key to limiting competition.
To be sure, there is potential for endogeneity in our specifications, but most of the potential critiques work against our findings. If better-performing firms also acquire market share, then we should see a positive relationship between mark-up and growth. If firms in poor countries over-report costs or under-report profits, we should see less profit rather than more profits in developing economies. If high-growth industries are more profitable, then we should see a positive relationship between mark-up and growth. Some remaining critiques are dealt with by our use of multiple fixed effects specifications and instrumentation strategies.
At the level of the industry, our best measure of protection from "new entrants" is the level of tariffs. We look at the effect of Lerner on the change in tariffs, which of course have been on a secular decline over the period of the sample. As predicted by the model, the higher the Lerner, the slower the reduction in the tariff rate. We also use data from Bloom et al. (2012) to test for the most likely alternative mechanism, that higher rents cause slower growth through the channel of allowing managerial slack. We find that controlling for management has little impact on our estimate of the impact of mark-up on productivity growth, although we lose some of the explanatory power of their data by collapsing from the firm level to the country-sector level.
Having established that rents are associated with lower initial development levels, slower growth within manufacturing sectors, as well as a slower-improving business climate, we then test whether there are any macroeconomic implications. We include the average level of mark-up across industrial sectors as a right-hand side variable in standard growth regressions and find that it is a robust negative predictor of economic growth, although the differential effect on poorer countries is not distinguishable from zero. A reduction in average mark-up by one standard deviation predicts higher GDP growth of 0.39 percentage points (compared to an average annual growth rate in our sample of 2.3 percent), in spite of the mark-up measure being just for the manufacturing sector. The effect of average mark-up on GDP growth is about one and a half times the size we would expect just from the direct effect of mark-up on growth in manufacturing value added, suggesting that high mark-up in manufacturing is indicitive of high mark-up in non-manufacturing sectors as well. In a model allowing for conditional convergence, the growth penalty from a one standard deviation increase in mark-up is about half of the growth advantage from a one standard deviation reduction in GDP, indicating that the benefits of catch-up growth from being poor are larger than the costs of having a bad political economy.
Taken together, these growth results suggest a slight recasting of the traditional conditional convergence model. Poor countries grow faster than rich countries because of the benefits of catch-up, but those countries also tend to have higher rents, which slows growth. Developing countries have a tailwind from being poor in the catch-up sense, but a headwind from being poor through an inferior political economy of rent-seeking business.
Our findings are consistent with the earlier political economy literature which finds a destructive effect of rents (Ades and Di Tella 1999, Baland and Francois 2000) as well as the business literature seeking to understand how the business environment can help explain sustained rents. For example, Chacar, Newburry, and Vissa (2010) find that a stronger antitrust environment is associated with decreases in performance persistence, or sustained profits. Chari and David (2012) find that the pro-market reforms in India resulted in a decrease in firms' ability to sustain superior profits. They are also consistent with the few IO papers that examine the link between competition and growth in developing countries. Carlin, Schaffer, and Seabright (2004) look at firms in transition economies and find that monopolies innovate less than firms facing competition, and Gorodnichenko, Svejnar, and Terrell (2010) find that foreign competition stimulates innovation. The measures of innovation used in these papers roughly correspond to our own modeling of innovation, rather than being inventions per se: new plants, new products, new technologies, or getting quality accreditation. In spite of the broad consistency of our findings with these earlier papers, the paper makes a unique contribution. Unlike the political economy literature, we explore the manufacturing sectors, and in so doing can use industry-level measures and increase the sample size from earlier studies by nearly two orders of magnitude. We also examine both mechanisms and growth effects. Unlike the business literature, the focus of our paper is not on firm profitability but instead from industry-level profitability to growth, reforms, and the overall growth of the economy. The insight is that what may be good for the players in one industry may not be good for the economy at large. And unlike the IO literature, we focus on the channel of rent seeking, finding that mechanism to be first order in poorer countries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the formal model. Section 3 describes the data and empirical specifications. Section 4 contains the main results establishing the link between rents and growth at the level of the industry. Section 5 evaluates the mechanisms of rent-seeking and managerial slack. Section 6 explores the growth implications. Section 7 concludes.
A simple model
In this section we develop a simple model to illustrate the tradeoff between rent-seeking and growth. We model rents or mark-up as determined by the level of competition within a market. Rent-seeking is the attempted blocking of a new entrant into the market by bribing or lobbying bureaucrats, and it is easier when the level of development is lower. Probabilistic entry is similar to the model in Aghion et al. (2005b) , although they focus on entrance of foreign firms. Growth occurs when a firm innovates to produce a new product, which generates an increased incentive for a firm in a more competitive environment to innovate to leave the competition behind, as in Arrow (1962) .
Set-up
In the first period, N identical firms compete in quantities, producing a homogenous good with inverse demand given by P (Q) = f gQ, where Q is the total quantity produced and f and g are positive parameters. Marginal cost is constant at c, and f > c. The total profit generated by the firms is
Mark-up of price over marginal cost is higher when N is lower, so high N in the theory corresponds to low mark-up in the empirical section. In between the first and second period, a potential innovator will have the option to pay a fixed cost h to leave the original market (market A) and create a new product, allowing it to operate as a monopolist in market B, earning a profit of ⇡ M . The firm may be prevented from undertaking a profitable innovation by a credit constraint; it may spend only the profits it earns in the first period and an exogenous level of credit . Whether or not the firm decides to innovate corresponds to productivity growth in the empirical section.
2 If the potential innovator decides to stay in market A, the incumbents then collusively decide on a level of rent-seeking, which reduces the likelihood of an additional competitor in the second period. If they collectively spend a, then the probability of an additional firm entering is 1 ↵ p a, with ↵ > 0 an indication of how easy it is to persuade bureaucrats to restrict entry. Note that the credit constraint can never bind here: the firms never want to spend more on rent-seeking than they earned in profits in the first period, because that would guarantee losses.
If an entrant does not arrive, the incumbents will once again earn ⇡(N ) in the second period. If one does, they will earn
For convenience, we define the reduction in total profits for the N incumbents caused by 2 As will be discussed below, productivity is measured in revenue terms, rather than physical terms. Creating a new market is only one way to generate more value per worker, but it is an important one, especially in poor countries where relatively few different kinds of goods are being produced (Hidalgo and Hausmann 2009) .
It is natural to treat N as a discrete variable, but we can also consider it as a continuous variable when analyzing the effect of a change in N . Note that the reduction in profits caused by one additional entrant is declining in N (because moving from a monopoly to a duopoly reduces profits far more than moving from 12 firms to 13):
The solution concept is symmetric Nash equilibrium. This allows us to disregard implausible equilibria where, for example, the incumbents could threaten to produce huge quantities in the second period if the potential innovator did not leave the market, or where one incumbent paid less than their share of the rent-seeking. It also allows us to ignore what happens in market A if the innovator leaves, because the outcome of interest is the innovation itself. Working backwards, if the innovator stays in market A, the incumbents' total profits in the second period as a function of rent-seeking will be
Solving the first-order condition gives
and
Thus, the firm will innovate if the fixed cost is less than the additional profits that are created:
and it has sufficient credit:
We can interpret h want as the highest fixed cost where innovation is still profitable and h can as the highest fixed cost where innovation is feasible given the credit constraint. To ensure that 1 ↵ p a remains above zero, it is sufficient to assume that ↵ < p 2d(N ). The purpose of this assumption is just to guarantee an interior solution so that we don't have to keep track of the possibility that rent-seeking drives the probability of entry to zero.
Comparative statics

Profits and development
In considering the relationship between observed profits and the development of a country, we analyze the situation where the potential innovator stays in the original market; innovation is generally difficult so this is more likely to be the relevant case. The change in total profits as a function of ↵ can be found from equation (7):
Therefore we expect that profits will be higher in countries with lower quality of government institutions (higher ↵), consistent with the political risk premium demanded by investors in such jurisdictions, and this result is confirmed in the data.
Productivity growth and competitiveness
An exogenous increase in the number of firms has two effects: it is less profitable for the potential innovator to stay in market A, which encourages it to flee from competition and create the second market, but it also reduces profits in the first period, which may prevent it from doing so. The result is that without appealing to the data, we cannot make any predictions of the effect on growth of increasing N and reducing mark-up.
Productivity growth and development
There are three relevant differences between rich and poor countries in the model. First, we assume that rent-seeking is easier in poor countries; this is motivated by the fact that corruption is generally decreasing with development. When rent-seeking is easier (i.e., ↵ is higher), the potential innovator has less incentive to create a new market, increasing the maximum fixed cost it would be willing to incur:
Second, there is unconditional convergence in manufacturing productivity because of the availability in catch-up growth (Rodrik 2013) . To incorporate that fact into the model, we assume that the profits generated by an innovator (⇡ M ) are higher in poor countries, because in poor countries it is possible to copy existing technology to create a new market. Increasing ⇡ M raises the threshold fixed cost that the innovator is willing to pay, making productivity growth more likely, because @h want @⇡ M = 1. Finally, the credit constraint may be more likely to bind in poor countries because there is less access to financial markets, which would make innovation more difficult. Two of these effects indicate that productivity growth should be lower in poor countries, and one suggests that it should be higher, but we cannot predict which side dominates without making further assumptions.
Productivity growth and the interaction of competitiveness and development
The differential effect of rent-seeking in rich and poor countries is a central question of this paper. In the model, with tension built in between the temptation to rent seek and the reward to innovate, we have ambiguous predictions for each of competitiveness and development on productivity growth, and not surprisingly we also generate an ambigous prediction on the cross partial without further assumptions.
Data and Empirical Specifications
Rents, competition, and mark-up
We are interested in the relationship between the business environment and productivity growth, and there are two related concepts that we can use to describe the former. The first is rents, or excess profits, defined as a fraction:
The second is the competitiveness of the market, which is commonly measured by the Lerner index, or mark-up ratio:
In practice, we do not observe the data that would be required to calculate either rents or the Lerner index exactly, but we can use the data that is available to generate a good approximation. Following Aghion, Braun, and Fedderke (2008) , we define mark-up as follows, mark-up = value added wage bill revenue .
Since value added is revenue minus cost of materials, and total variable cost is the sum of the wage bill and the cost of materials, we can also write, mark-up = revenue -total variable cost revenue .
The only discrepancy between our definition of mark-up and rents is that rents should also subtract depreciation of capital, so mark-up will be higher than true rents. We have access to data on capital expenditures, but not to capital stocks. We do use sector fixed effects throughout, so to the extent that depreciation as a fraction of output is similar across countries within the same manufacturing sector, we can address this concern. Also, as a robustness check, we proxy for depreciation using a lagged average of capital expenditures and the main results hold.
To see how our definition of mark-up approximates the true Lerner index, substitute average variable cost for marginal cost, and multiply the numerator and denominator by the quantity sold:
Lerner t price ⇤ quantity average variable cost ⇤ quantity price ⇤ quantity ,
which is exactly the definition of mark-up in (16). With the data that we have, we cannot distinguish between competitiveness and rents, so we remain agnostic as to which one drives the results and use the two terms interchangeably throughout the paper. Disentangling the two remains on our agenda for future research. Productivity is defined by productivity = value added employees ,
and productivity growth in year t = productivity in t productivity in t 1 productivity in t 1
Note that productivity growth, our main dependent variable of interest, is defined as the change in the value added per worker, rather than the change in the number of units created per worker. In some ways, this is desirable, as a change from low quality coffee beans to gourmet beans will show up as a change in our definition of productivity, but it would not if we only focused on physical productivity. The downside to our approach is that value added also reflects market power, so that an identical pound of coffee beans is reported as different levels of value added if the producer is a monopolist instead of a competitive firm, and productivity growth may also reflect a change in competitiveness (Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson 2008) . Many papers in the literature define productivity growth as improvement in total factor productivity; that is, the change in the output that could be generated from a given quantity of labor and capital. We cannot use the same measure because we lack data on capital, but we do not view this as a limitation. If firms are diverting firms away from capital investment in favor of wasteful rent-seeking, that would show up as no change in total factor productivity but a decrease in productivity, and this is exactly the kind of damage from rent-seeking that we are interested in.
Empirical Specifications
In the primary specification of the model, we assume that productivity growth from time t 1 to t is a function of lagged mark-up, log GDP per capita, and fixed effects for year, country, and sector, with or without an interaction term of mark-up times log GDP per capita. That is, we assume
where i indexes countries, j indexes manufacturing sectors, and t indexes time. We assume that the error term is uncorrelated with the independent variables, so
Value added in time t 1 is part of the definition of productivity growth from t 1 to t and mark-up in t 1, so it appears on both sides of (20), and it is reasonable to be concerned that measurement error in value added could lead to a spurious negative correlation between mark-up and productivity growth, as pointed out in Aghion, Braun, and Fedderke (2008) . In our main specification, we instrument for mark-up in period t 1 with mark-up in the same country-sector in period t 2. This solves the problem as long as measurement error in value added in period t 2 is uncorrelated with the difference in measurement error between period t and t 1.
Fixed effects for country allow us to control for omitted variables that are constant within a country over time, such as geography. Sector fixed effects control for the possibility that our results are being driven by different compositions of sectors being produced in rich and poor countries, and time fixed effects allow for arbitrary time trends in the data.
We allow for heteroskedasticity in the error term as well as correlation in the error term within a country by clustering standard errors at the country level (we also tried clustering at the country-sector level and found the standard errors were lower, so we cluster at the country level throughout). In other variations we consider different fixed effects specifications and replace productivity growth with growth in value added and log GDP with political stability.
Data
The INDSTAT2 2013 ISIC Revision 3, published by the Statistics Unit of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) is our main source for manufacturing data. It covers over 160 countries from 1963 to 2010, categorized according to the 2-digit level of the International Standard Industrial Classification. UNIDO collects the data from a variety of sources, including national publications, published and unpublished international sources, and statisticians employed by UNIDO. Informal manufacturing is often excluded from these sources, so this paper should be regarded as addressing only formal manufacturing.
There are 23 manfacturing categories in the original data, but there are four pairs of categories that are only reported separately starting in the 1980s, and we combine those sectors back together for continuity. We also exclude the recycling sector due to lack of coverage, leaving us with 18 sectors. To give a sense of the fineness of the data, three examples of sectors are textiles, chemicals, and wood products excluding furniture. Manufacturing contributes more to GDP in some countries than others: at the 10th percentile among our observations, it makes up 7 percent of the economy, whereas at the 90th percentile it makes up 29 percent.
The data we use are value added, output, wages (all reported in current US dollars), and employees, which are converted to constant (year 2000) values by multiplying by the US real GDP and dividing by the nominal US GDP, as reported in the World Development Indicators (WDI). We use these data to calculate productivity and mark-up as described above. Some countries are missing data required to calculate mark-up; there are 49 countries with sufficient data to calculate mark-up in 1963, between 74 and 91 from 1970 to 2008, and fewer for 2009 and 2010. Appendix table A1 lists the countries in the sample and the number of years where they have sufficient data to be included in the preferred specification.
The case of Latvia is instructive to describe the UNIDO data in action. As Latvia conducted dramatic reforms upon its emergence from the Soviet Union in an effort to join the European Union (see Di Tella, Abdelal, and Kindred 2012) , the average mark-up in its manufacturing sectors fell steadily, from 30% in 1994 to just 13% in 2009. At first productivity growth was high as jobs were slashed, but quickly it fell as the economy struggled to reach a new equilibrium. In the five years from 1995, productivity growth averaged 3% while the mark-up averaged 26%. In the five years from 2002, during which Latvia was one of the fastest growing countries in Europe, productivity growth averaged 19% while the mark-up averaged 19%. In 2008, during the global financial crisis which took a particularly bad toll on Latvia, productivity growth fell to -21% and margins were tight at 14%.
The WDI, published by the World Bank and updated in 2013, provides a number of other variables we use. They include the cost of starting a business, which is an indication of the healthiness of the business environment, and is available from 2003 to 2010. There are also controls used in the growth regressions, which cover from 1970 to 2010: government consumption as a percentage of GDP, gross enrollment in secondary school, population growth, and life expectancy. Finally, the WDI is the source for GDP per capita (in 2000 USD), and for M2 as a percentage of GDP, which we take as a proxy for the development of the financial sector, both of which are available from 1963 to 2010.
The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) provides data on political and social attributes from 1984 to 2010, compiled by experts in each country (PRS Group 2012). Military in politics, corruption, and bureaucratic quality are three components of the political risk rating, which we relabel political stability for clarity. In all cases, a higher number is better, so we relabel their variable corruption as "lack of corruption," etc. These variables are rescaled from 0 to 1.
Summary Statistics
In table 1 we provide summary statistics for some of the most important variables. Mark-up, productivity growth, and value added growth are all Winsorized, meaning that any values outside of the 1st to 99th percentiles are replaced by the 1st or 99th percentile values, to limit the impact of outliers.
The average mark-up is 24.5% in the poorer countries in the sample and 21.2% in the richer countries. Of course, this excludes capital deductions (which would probably amplify the difference) and it accords with the prediction from the model that profits are higher in poor countries. Average productivity growth of 5.6% in poor countries is slightly higher than the 4.4% in rich countries, consistent with the catch-up growth we model and with Rodrik (2013) which finds absolute convergence in manufacturing productivity across countries. An average of 13.9 of the 18 sectors are being actively produced in the poor countries in the year 2000 compared with 16.5 in the rich countries, consistent with Hausmann and Hidalgo (2009) in which richer countries produce more products. Corruption, political stability, wealth, and productivity fall in normal ranges and vary across the two samples as would be expected.
Correlates of mark-up
Our model predicts higher mark-up in less developed countries. We model development as the ease of bribing a bureaucrat to prevent the entry of a new firm. This measure correlates with income per capita but may be better approximated with other measures of political and bureaucratic development. In this subsection we show that virtually any measure of underdevelopment is correlated with a higher mark-up. Our variables are not cherry-picked. This correlation is consistent and robust.
To give a sense of the types of environment where we observe high mark-up, table 2 presents some correlates of mark-up. All of the variables are coded so that high numbers are better, and in every column, the dependent variable is mark-up (observed at the country-year level). In the first column, the only independent variables are real log GDP per capita and fixed effects for year, and we see that poor countries tend to have higher mark-up. In the other columns, we control for GDP per capita so that we are not just picking up the income effect on high mark-up. Column 2 examines whether countries that are more likely to have military involvement in politics have higher mark-up; the correlation between military in politics is stronger than that for GDP. Columns 3 -6 show that low mark-up is correlated with overall political stability (column 3), good bureaucracy (column 4), a low start-up cost for new businesses (column 5), and low corruption (column 6)-most of which are better predictors of mark-up than income per capita. These findings would not be surprising to investors in emerging markets who assign a larger political risk premium to riskier jurisdictions, effectively increasing the discount rate on the investment and requiring a higher rate of return.
Results
Primary specification
The results for the primary (IV) specification and two comparison OLS regressions are in table 3. The dependent variable in every column is productivity growth from period t 1 to t. The first three regressions are IV, with mark-up in period t 2 instrumenting for mark-up in period t 1, 3 as discussed above, and the fourth and fifth columns are OLS. The first stage (not reported) is very strong, which is an indication that mark-up is persistent over time, and there is no concern about a weak instrument. The first stage statistic that we consider is the KleibergenPaap (2006) F statistic, which is the appropriate first stage statistic in the presence of heteroskedasticity and clustered standard errors (Baum, Schaffer, Stillman 2010) . If the interaction term is omitted, meaning that Note: t-values in parentheses. Productivity growth is measured from time t 1 to t. In the first three columns, we instrument for mark-up in t 1 with mark-up in t 2. In the fourth and fifth columns, we use OLS with mark-up measured in period t 1 or t 2. The unit of observation is a country-sector-year.
In the first model, mark-up is the only independent variable, along with fixed effects for country, sector, and year. In the second, real log GDP per capita is included as a control, to ensure that mark-up is not just a proxy for low GDP. Mark-up is strongly significant and is negatively correlated with productivity growth. The third column is our primary specification, where the interaction term of (log GDP per capita x mark-up) is also included, which is statistically significant and positive. This provides evidence for one of the main claims in the paper: a lack of competition is most harmful in poor countries.
The interaction term here has been demeaned, or defined as (mark-up -mean mark-up) x (log GDP -mean log GDP), implying that the coefficients reported on mark-up and log GDP in the third column can be interpreted as the effect of those respective variables when the other variable is at its mean (Balli and Sørenson 2013) . If we did not demean the interaction term, then the reported coefficient on mark-up would be the effect of a change in mark-up when log GDP was zero, which (thankfully) does not happen often. Notice that the reported coefficients on log GDP and mark-up are similar moving from column (2) to column (3).
The magnitude of the effect is large, but not implausibly so. The standard deviation of mark-up in period t 1 is instrumented with mark-up in period t 2, the F value is over 2,000. With the interaction term, where the instruments are mark-up in period t 2 and mark-up in period t 2 x log GDP per capita in t 1 and the endogenous variables are the same variables but measured one period forward, the F value is about 35, still well above the rule of thumb of 10. mark-up is about .12, with a mean of .23. Based on the results in the third column, we predict a one standard deviation decrease in mark-up would increase productivity growth in a poor country (25th percentile of wealth) by 4.7 percentage points, and in a rich country (75th percentile of wealth) by 2.9 percentage points. This is substantial compared to the mean of productivity growth, 5.2 percent, but we regard it as believable because the standard deviation is quite high, at 26 percent. The fourth column presents an OLS regression where mark-up is measured in period t 1. The magnitude of the coefficient on mark-up is approximately 50percent larger than in our primary specification in column 3, an indication that it is important to instrument with lagged mark-up to avoid measurement error problems. The fifth column is also OLS, with mark-up in period t 2. Here the results are similar to our primary specification, but the coefficients are somewhat closer to zero, as expected.
In figure 1 , we show the marginal effect of mark-up on productivity growth at different income levels, based on our preferred specification (column 3), with a 95 percent confidence interval. Here we see graphically that mark-up is damaging at all income levels (except possibly at the very highest levels), and more so at lower incomes.
Robustness
Instrumenting for mark-up
The primary challenge to our claim is that some unobserved variable is causing both high mark-up and low productivity growth. A perfect instrument would affect productivity growth only through the channel of mark-up and vary exogenously in a way that is orthogonal to any unobserved variables. Finding such an instrument is difficult for a data set that covers so many countries and years, as Aghion, Braun, and Fedderke (2008) find. They write that the opening of the economy to trade, the degree of tradability of the industry, and the level of tariffs all were weak instruments. We can add terms of trade shocks to the list of variables that generate weak first stages. Their most successful instrument is import penetration, which is relevant in one of their two datasets, but not in the UNIDO dataset that their paper and ours both use, and it also suffers from some endogeneity concerns.
We propose another instrument for mark-up, which we acknowledge is also not perfect. It is the simple average of mark-up in the other sectors in the same country-year. The main appeal of this as an instrument is that it allows us to rule out at least some of the possible omitted variables that could be driving our results, namely those that are specific to a particular sector. For example, we can rule out a story where new inventions both cause high productivity growth and allow for entry, driving down mark-ups and generating a negative relationship between mark-up and productivity growth. If that were the case, and the effect was limited to the sector that had the invention, then our instrumentation strategy would yield no relationship because the predicted mark-up would not be affected by the invention. The instrument has another desirable quality in that any instrumentalvariables procedure can only identify the impact of the mark-up that co-varies with the instrument (Angrist 2004) . In this case, the average mark-up in other sectors is likely to capture the mark-up that is driven by the overall business environment, which comes close to the phenomenon that we are trying to uncover in the first place-whether rents for business are good for growth.
Our results with the instrument are presented in tables 4. The first two columns are the first stage results, with the dependent variables of mark-up and mark-up x log GDP. Note: t-values in parentheses. The first two columns present the first stage, and the second two present IV results. In the first two columns, the dependent variables are mark-up and mark-up x log GDP respectively, and in the other two it is productivity growth from t 1 to t. In the third and fourth columns, simple average of mark-up in the other sectors of the same country ("other mark-up") and other mark-up x log GDP are used as instruments for mark-up and mark-up x log GDP, all in t 1. The third and fourth columns should be compared to the second and third columns of table 3. In every column there are fixed effects for country, year, and sector.
Mark-up in other sectors is highly predictive of mark-up and mark-up in other sectors x log GDP is highly predictive of mark-up x log GDP. The Kleibergen-Paap F statistic is 24.6, above the rule of thumb of 10. The next two are the IV results, with and without an interaction term. In the regression with no interaction term (column 3), the coefficient on mark-up is similar to our main specification that simply instruments with lagged mark-up (-0.37 compared to -0.32). With the interaction term included (column 4), the coefficient on mark-up x log GDP is still significant, but it is much higher than in our main specification (0.34 compared to 0.058). We take this as further evidence that mark-up is most damaging in poor countries, but we should be cautious when making statements about the magnitude of the difference.
Alternate fixed effects
In our primary specification, we have fixed effects for year, country, and sector. In the first two columns of appendix table A2, we remove one fixed effect, so that we have year and sector fixed effects and then year and country fixed effects. Removing the country fixed effects moderates the coefficient on mark-up from about -0.3 to -0.2, and on the interaction term from about 0.06 to 0.045. This is an indication that the relationship between markup and productivity growth is strongest when looking within a particular country, but the relationship is still evident when all countries are lumped together. Removing the sector fixed effects has surprisingly little impact on our estimated coefficients. We also consider specifications with finer-grained fixed effects. With country-sector and year fixed effects, we are comparing French clothing manufacturing to French clothing manufacturing at different dates, but not two different French manufacturing sectors or two different countries. The coefficient on mark-up approximately doubles to -0.6, and the interaction term also becomes stronger, with a coefficient of 0.11, further evidence that the relationship between mark-up and productivity growth is strongest when looking within countries rather than between them. If we use country-year and sector fixed effects, meaning we compare data from Chile in 1980 but not across countries or years, the coefficient on mark-up is about the same as the primary specification, at -0.31, while the coefficient on the interaction is only 0.037. In every case, there is significance on both.
One advantage to this strategy is that we can rule out the possibility that all of the change in productivity growth is being driven by variation at the country-year level. For example, it is not possible that our results are being driven entirely by the business cycle (or any other national-level panel data variable), because then mark-up would have no relationship with productivity growth when country-year fixed effects were included.
In the final column we remove all fixed effects entirely and the broad results hold.
Alternate variables
In appendix table A3, we examine the robustness of the results to replacing log GDP per capita with ICRG's political stability measure and productivity growth with growth in value added. Political stability and GDP per capita are closely correlated (⇢ = 0.76), which is not surprising as rich countries tend to have more stable, better functioning governments. Political stability is probably a better proxy for the feasibility of rent-seeking than wealth, but GDP per capita has better coverage, so that is what we use in the main specification.
Growth in value added, also defined in percentage terms, is a useful check because we want to make sure that we are really capturing a positive outcome when productivity growth increases. If the output of a manufacturing sector drops by 50% and the employment drops by 75%, then we would say that productivity doubled, even though it is questionable whether the economy is really in a better position, especially in light of the fact that productivity in the manufacturing sector tends to be higher than in the overall economy (Rodrik 2013) . Table A3 shows that all of the main results hold when making these substitutions. The only exception is that the interaction term of mark-up x political stability is not significant when the dependent variable is productivity growth.
Alternate samples and Lerner
In appendix table A4 we examine the robustness of the results to dropping different subsamples of the data. First, our story is fundamentally about domestic business markets, and one may be worried that the data combine multinational activity with domestic manufacturing. We looked at the OECD statistics of outward value added activity by American and Japanese multinationals (the only countries that provided these data) in manufacturing and isolated the four categories with the highest share of multinational activity: electronics, motor vehicles, chemical products, and precision manufactures. In column 1 we drop these four industries and the results are barely changed. Second, our model expects some underlying level of competition, but the sample includes small countries like Lesotho (with three years of observations) that may simply not offer the depth for competitive dynamics to result. In column 2 we drop the ten percent of the observations coming from the countries with the smallest population. The results are barely changed. Third, the construction of the competition measure is at the level of the country-industry, but in fact many firms compete with other firms from different countries in export markets. A Herfindahl measure would have been much more inappropriate given this dynamic than the Lerner is, but it is still interesting to examine whether the results are driven by the non-tradeables. In column 3 we examine export shares by country-industry-year and drop the most traded half of the sample. The results hold.
Finally, in column 4 we redefine the Lerner index to subtract out our best measure of depreciation, which we define rather crudely as the average of the prior 5 years of capital expenditures. Again, the results hold.
Credit constraints
The evidence thus far indicates that high rents slow productivity growth, particularly in poor countries, but perhaps we can find subsamples where they are beneficial. We are looking for a case where rents could alleviate credit constraints, which is most likely in a sector where finance is important and in a country where the financial system is unlikely to provide loans in the absence of rents. Our measure for the external finance required in a sector is from Rajan and Zingales (1998) , who use firm-level data to characterize sectors by the amount of capital they require, and we split the 18 sectors into the nine with more and less capital required. Our proxy for financial market development is M2 as a fraction of GDP, from the WDI (2013), and we split countries based on their overall average M2/GDP, so that a country does not move between categories in different years. Table 5 gives the results of our primary specification broken down into the quadrants of high and low finance required and financial market development. If rents can be useful, we would expect mark-up to be least damaging where finance is important and difficult to acquire (column 3) and most damaging in the opposite case (column 2). In fact, we see the reverse, where the coefficient on mark-up is most negative is column 3 and least negative in column 2. We cannot say that mark-up is most damaging in column 3, as the coefficient is very close to the one in column 4 when external finance needs are also high but financial market development is better, but we can reject the hypothesis that the coefficients in columns 2 and 3 are equal at the 1% confidence level. We interpret this as evidence that barriers to entry raise the returns for incumbents to keep a sector uncompetitive. This is consistent with our model, where firms divert more resources towards rent-seeking when it is easier to keep entrants out. It may also provide one explanation for the surprising finding Table 5 : Mark-up and productivity growth in sub-samples
Mark-up -0. 351 -0.196 -0.457 -0.446 (-7.50 Note: t-values in parentheses. The dependent variable, productivity growth, is measured from time t 1 to t. We instrument for mark-up in t 1 with mark-up in t 2. The unit of observation is a country-sector-year. External finance required is from Rajan and Zingales (1998) and M2/GDP is from WDI (2013). There are fixed effects for country, year, and sector. (Singh 1997 ) that firms in emerging markets were less likely to use retained earnings to finance growth than developed-country firms: when retained earnings are high, they don't need to grow at all.
Mechanism
The focus in the previous sections was that anticompetitive practices damage productivity growth. Here we argue that this occurs through the political economy channel. We test through the only potential country-sector variable on rent seeking for which we have data, tariffs, and find that tariffs fall more slowly in sectors with rents. Tariffs are not a direct measure of barriers to entry of other domestic firms, but they do affect the cost of imported substitutes. We also test for an alternate channel broadly consistent with the main specification in the previous section, which is lazy management. That is, firms in high-rent sectors can rest on their laurels. Although our data coverage is limited, we do not find support for the hypothesis that slower growth is due to weaker management.
Tariffs
Tariff rates have been falling on average, but they are less likely to fall when firms are earning higher profits. This should be a surprise, since the main argument in favor of tariffs is to protect fledgling industries that need help in getting established. Tariff data come from the TRAINS database, published by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2013) . Tariffs are weighted averages, either for the actual tariffs applied (labeled AHS in the dataset), or for the tariffs applied to countries without a special trade agreement (MFN). Both cover the years between 1988 and 2008.
The dependent variable is the percentage change in the tariff rate, so that a change from 100% to 50% is considered the same as the change from 20% to 10%. The most extreme 1% of values on both ends for the change in tariff rate are replaced with the 1st and 99th percentile values to reduce the influence of outliers, and the results of these regressions are in table 6. In columns 2 and 4, the level of the tariffs is also included as a control to rule out the possibility that sectors with high profits have low tariffs already, making further reductions unlikely. Adding this control has a very small effect on the other coefficients, so we conclude this is not what is happening.
The coefficients on mark-up in both regressions are signficant and positive in both regressions. The positive sign on the interaction term (significant in one pair of regressions but not the other) is a puzzle, because it says that mark-up prevents tariff reduction more strongly in rich countries than in poor countries, which is the opposite of what we would expect. We suspect this may be driven by nontariff barriers being the protectionist vehicle of choice in poor countries (Michalopoulos 1999) .
Management
Here we consider an alternate mechanism through which rents could depress productivity growth: lazy or satisficing managers, as in Hart (1983) . We consider the hypothesis that mark-up is driving the slower productivity growth of profitable firms by controlling for management style and considering the effect on the measured coefficient on mark-up. Bloom et al. (2012) conducted telephone surveys of senior managers of over 10,000 firms in 20 countries between 2002 and 2010, asking open-ended questions and coding them from 1 (worst) to 5. We first collapse their firm-level data to the country-sector level data. The mean number of observations for a country-sector combination with at least one observation is under three, so we ignore temporal variation and further collapse their data to a single management score for each country-sector.
As our dependent variable, we use productivity growth from 2002 to 2009 (we leave 2010 out of the regression because the manufacturing data for 2010 is incomplete). The Bloom et al. (2012) that management practices have a substantial impact on total factor productivity or that uncompetitive markets foster weak management. Rather, in arguing that mark-up is deterimental beyond its effect through the management channel, our paper should be viewed as complementary.
Growth
We have found that high rents or mark-up is damaging to growth within a manufacturing sector, and the level of mark-up in other manufacturing sectors in a country positively predicts the level of mark-up in a manufacturing sector and negatively predicts the growth in that sector. But manufacturing is a relatively small share of the economy, particularly in most developing countries (Rodrik 2013) . What goes on in manufacturing may have no overall bearing on the economy at large. This may be especially the case for the formalsector firms that are picked up in the UNIDO data. After all, Rodrik (2013) , with the same UNIDO dataset, documents unconditional convergence in manufacturing but does not find evidence for the rest of the economy.
However, the rent-seeking channel that this paper models and attempts to test is a political economy channel that we have no reason to believe is only expressed in formal manufacturing. For example, protectionist measures in Liberia limit access to such sectors as video clubs and tire repair shops (U.S. Department of Commerce 2012), and in the Philippines to recruiting firms and radio stations (Werker et al. 2013) .
We take a simple average of the mark-up ratios in each of the manufacturing sectors and, using data from the WDI, include it as a control variable in the standard growth regressions: a non-overlapping ordinary least squares (OLS) Barro growth regression as well as an overlapping generalized method of moments (GMM) model. Table 8 presents the results. The first column includes only the average mark-up and initial GDP per capita, and the effect of the mark-up is negative and significant; the coefficient of -0.047 means a one standard deviation decrease in average mark-up is predicted to add 0.38 percentage points of growth. In contrast, the coefficient on initial income is essentially zero, consistent with a lack of unconditional convergence in the sample. The next column includes mark-up as well as some of the usual suspects in the growth regressions: government spending, school enrollment, population growth, and life expectancy. These are chosen to follow the regressors used by Bekaert et al. (2005) , who in turn is following Barro (1997) , all with the aim of reducing the possibility of data-mining. With the other controls in column 2, the coefficient on initial income is now negative and significant, consistent with conditional convergence. The coefficient on mark-up remains statistically significant and almost unchanged in size at -0.049, meaning a one standard deviation decrease in average mark-up leads to a 0.39 percentage point improvement in GDP growth. Among the other variables, population growth is significant and negative, and life expectancy is positive. In four additional unreported regressions, we included one of the four control variables along with mark-up, and mark-up remains statistically significant in all cases, with a a coefficient ranging from -0.038 to -0.054.
The growth penalty from a one standard deviation increase in mark-up is about half of the growth advantage from a one standard deviation reduction in GDP, indicating that the benefits of catch-up growth from being poor are larger than the costs of having a bad political economy. Column 3 includes an interaction term between mark-up and initial income to test whether the effect of rents is worse for growth in poorer countries. The coefficient is positive, suggesting that the effect may be worse in poor countries, but the coefficient is imprecisely measured.
Columns 4 and 5 are similar to 2 and 3, except we use GMM, following Caselli, Esquivel, and Lefort (1996) . OLS estimates may be inconsistent due to correlated individual effects and endogenous explanatory variables, for which the method in Caselli, Esquivel, and Lefort (1996) (and used by many researchers since then) is designed to correct. The results are very similar to the OLS. The countries exhibit conditional convergence, with a negative and significant coefficient on initial wealth. The effect of the average mark-up remains negative and significant. The interaction term between wealth and mark-up in column 2 is also positive but statistically insignificant. Taken together, these results suggest that the rents we measure in the manufacturing sector may be indicative of an overall environment in which incumbents rent-seek to prevent challengers, which lowers the overall growth of the economy. Whether or not we control for initial income, countries in which businesses are able to maintain high profit margins grow slower, in spite of the fact that these countries might otherwise enjoy some of the "advantages of backwardness" (Gerschenkron 1962) consistent with a lower level of economic development. Of course income and mark-up are inversely correlated. This suggests a recasting of the usual view of convergence, and may explain why convergence has not generally been a feature of economic development (Pritchett 1997) . We find that developing countries are both poor (which provides a growth boost, once some other factors are controlled for) but also have a higher mark-up, indicative of a worse political economy of business (which provides a growth drag).
It may be the case, as suggested in North et al. (2012, p. 9) , that many non-converging developing countries are politically "held together" by their rents even as those same rents prevent them from generating prosperity for their non-elites. Indeed, North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009) argue that rents are useful for political stability whereas we have restricted our attention to productivity and economic growth as outcome variables that proxy for welfare. We re-ran the analysis in table 8 but with political stability as the outcome variable. The results (available from the authors on request) are incolnclusive: the coefficient of the association between mark-up and political stability appears to be slightly positive when income per capita is under $1000, and otherwise negative, but the standard errors are so large that they do not rule out the opposite result.
Conclusion
This paper has attempted to test the question of whether rents are good for development-brought to the forefront of scholarship and policy by North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009)-by using a rich dataset on manufacturing sectors and applying the methods from the competition-and-growth literature of Aghion and co-authors. While the results cannot be seen as incontrovertable due to the challenges of endogeneity and the presence of a strong alternative hypothesis (management) that cannot be discounted completely, the evidence all points in one direction.
Rents, as measured by a high-markup which is also an indication of low competition, seem to slow growth in productivity or output. The effect is strongest in poor countries. Higher rents are associated with a slower removal of tariffs, indicative of the channel in our model: firms rent-seek to prevent competition and maintain their high margins. This investment in rent-seeking may be in lieu of investment in innovation or new productive assets, which slows the overall growth of the sector. In industries in which high profits should be essential in generating growth, those sectors that would otherwise need external finance but in a country with weak financial markets, the negative impact of rents on growth is especially strong. We do not find evidence (although our data availability is limited) to support the alternative hypothesis most consistent with the data, that sectors with higher rents have inefficient managers. Finally, we find that countries with more rents in the manufacturing sector grow slower, even when other controls are introduced.
Ideally, this paper would have looked at other measures of rents, or excess profits, like return on assets and return on equity. Unfortunately, the data coverage for these variables is much weaker, particularly across time in the less developed countries which are our focus in this paper. That said, this remains an avenue for future work. Another important research question that this paper leaves unanswered is what allows a country to be able to escape from an equilibrium of limited but non-expanding profits (Pritchett and Werker 2012) . Note: t-values in parentheses. The dependent variables (productivity and value added growth) are measured from time t 1 to t. We instrument for mark-up in t 1 with mark-up in t 2. The unit of observation is a countrysector-year. Political stabilty is ICRG's "political risk rating," with high numbers representing stronger political systems (PRS Group, 2012) . There are fixed effects for country, year, and sector. Note: t-values in parentheses. The dependent variable, productivity growth is measured from time t 1 to t. We instrument for mark-up in t 1 with mark-up in t 2. The unit of observation is a countrysector-year. In column one we remove the four sectors with the highest multinational presence. In column two we drop the smallest 10% of countries. In column three we consider the less traded sectors. In column four we redefine mark-up by subtracting a five-year moving average of capital expenditures. There are fixed effects for country, year, and sector.
